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Abstract. We define the notion of a model of higher-order modal logic
in an arbitrary elementary topos E . In contrast to the well-known in-
terpretation of (non-modal) higher-order logic, the type of propositions
is not interpreted by the subobject classifier ΩE , but rather by a suit-
able complete Heyting algebra H . The canonical map relating H and ΩE
both serves to interpret equality and provides a modal operator on H in
the form of a comonad. Examples of such structures arise from surjec-
tive geometric morphisms f : F → E , where H = f∗ΩF . The logic differs
from non-modal higher-order logic in that the principles of functional and
propositional extensionality are not longer valid but may be replaced by
modalized versions. The usual Kripke, neighborhood, and sheaf seman-
tics for propositional and first-order modal logic are subsumed by this
notion.
Introduction
In many conventional systems of semantics for quantified modal logic, models are
built on presheaves. Given a set K of “possible worlds”, Kripke’s semantics [11], for
instance, assigns to each world k ∈ K a domain of quantification P (k) — regarded
as the set of possible individuals that “exist” in k — and then ∃xϕ is true at k iff
some a ∈ P (k) satisfies ϕ at k. David Lewis’s counterpart theory [13] does the same
(though it further assumes that P (k) and P (l) are disjoint for k 6= l ∈ K). Such
an assignment P of domains to worlds is a presheaf P : K → Sets over the set of
worlds, thus an object of the topos SetsK . (Due to the disjointness assumption one
may take counterpart theory as using objects of the slice category Sets/K, which
however is categorically equivalent to SetsK .) Kripke-sheaf semantics for quantified
modal logic [7, 4, 6, 22] is another example of this sort. Indeed, both counterpart
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theory and Kripke-sheaf semantics interpret unary formulas by subsets of the “total
set of elements”
∑
k∈K P (k), and, more generally, n-ary formulas by relations of type:
P(
∑
k∈K
P (k)n) ∼= SubSetsK (P
n).
In fact, counterpart theory and Kripke-sheaf semantics interpret the non-modal part
of the logic in the same way. (Kripke’s semantics differs somewhat in interpreting
n-ary formulas instead as subsets of K × (
⋃
k∈K P (k))
n.)
Among these presheaf-based semantics, the principal difference consists in how
to interpret the modal operator . Let K be a set of worlds K = |K| equipped with
a relation k ≤ j of “accessibility”. Kripke declares that an individual a ∈
⋃
k∈K P (k)
satisfies a property ϕ at world k ∈ K iff a satisfies ϕ in all j ≥ k. Lewis instead
introduces a “counterpart” relation among individuals, and deems that a ∈ P (k)
satisfies ϕ iff all counterparts of a satisfy ϕ. We may take Kripke-sheaf semantics
as giving a special case of Lewis’s interpretation: Assuming K to be a preorder, the
semantics takes a presheaf P : K → Sets on Kop, and not just on the underlying
set |K|, so that a model comes with comparison maps αkj : P (k)→ P (j) whenever
k ≤ j in K. Then αkj : P (k) → P (j) gives a counterpart relation: αkj(a) is the
counterpart in the world j of the individual a ∈ P (k), so that a satisfies ϕ iff
αkj(a) satisfies ϕ for all j ≥ k. (Notable differences between Kripke-sheaf semantics
and Lewis’s are the following: In the former, K can be any preorder, whereas Lewis
only considers the universal relation on K. Also, since P is a presheaf, the former
assumes that a ∈ P (k) has one and only one counterpart in every j ≥ k.)
In terms of interior operators, this gives an interpretation of  on the poset
Sub
Sets
|K|(uP ) of sub-presheaves of uP where u : SetsK → Sets|K| is the evident
forgetful functor. Note that such sub-presheaves are just subsets of
∑
k∈K P (k). Ex-
plicitly, given the presheaf P onK and any subset ϕ ⊆ uP of elements of
∑
k∈K P (k),
then ϕ ⊆ ϕ ⊆ uP is the largest subpresheaf contained in ϕ.
Observe that u is the inverse image part of a fundamental example of a geometric
morphism between toposes, namely, u = i∗ for the (surjective) geometric morphism
i∗ ⊣ i∗ : Sets
|K| −→ SetsK
induced by the “inclusion” i : |K| →֒ K of the underlying set |K| into K. In par-
ticular, u is restriction along i. This observation leads to a generalization of these
various presheaf models to a general topos-theoretic semantics for first-order modal
logic [1, 5, 15, 19], which gives a model based on any surjective geometric mor-
phism f : F → E . Indeed, for each A in E , the inverse image part f ∗ : E → F
restricts to subobjects to give an injective complete distributive lattice homomor-
phism ∆A : SubE(A)→ SubF(f
∗A), which always has a right adjoint ΓA. Composing
these yields an endofunctor ∆AΓA on the Heyting algebra SubF(f
∗A):
SubF(f
∗A) ⊤
ΓA //
∆AΓA 99 SubE(A)
∆A
oo (1)
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In the special case considered above, the interior operation on the “big algebra”
P(
∑
k∈K
P (k)) ∼= Sub
Sets
|K|(uP )
determines the “small algebra” Sub
Sets
K(P ) as the Heyting algebra of upsets in∑
k∈K P (k) (an upset S ⊆
∑
k∈K P (k) is a subset that is closed under the counterpart
relation: a ∈ S for a ∈ P (k) implies αkj(a) ∈ S for all j ≥ k.) Moreover, ΓP is
the operation giving “the largest upset contained in . . . ”, and ∆P is the inclusion of
upsets into the powerset. In this case, the logic is “classical”, since the powerset is
a Boolean algebra.
In the general case, the operator  is of course interpreted by ∆AΓA, which
always satisfies the axioms for an S4 modality, since ∆AΓA is a left exact comonad.
The specialist will note that both ∆A and ΓA are natural in A, in a suitable sense,
so that this interpretation will satisfy the Beck-Chevalley condition required for it
to behave well with respect to substitution, interpreted as pullback (see [1]).
This, then, is how topos-theoretic semantics generalizes Kripke-style and related
semantics for quantified modal logic (cf. [1]). Now let us further observe that, since F
is a topos, it in fact has enough structure to also interpret higher-order logic, and so
a geometric morphism f : F → E will interpret higher-order modal logic. This is the
logic that the current paper investigates. The first step of our approach is to observe
that, because higher-order logic includes a type of “propositions”, interpreted by a
subobject classifier Ω, the natural operations on the various subobject lattices in (1)
can be internalized as operations on Ω. Moreover, the relevant part of the geometric
morphism f : F → E , giving rise to the modal operator, can also be internalized,
so that one really just needs the topos E and a certain algebraic structure on its
subobject classifier ΩE . That structure replaces the geometric morphism f by the
induced operations on the internal algebras f∗ΩF and ΩE inside the topos E . More
generally, the idea is to describe a notion of an “algebraic” model inside a topos
E , using the fact that S4 modalities always occur as adjoint pairs between suitable
algebras.
In a bit more detail, the higher-order logical language will be interpreted w.r.t.
a complete Heyting algebra H in E , extending ideas from traditional algebraic se-
mantics for intuitionistic logic [16, 21]. The modal operator on H arises from an
(internal) adjunction
H ⊤
τ //
iτ 99 ΩE
i
oo (2)
where i is a monic frame map and τ classifies the top element of H . (This, of course,
is just the unique map of locales from H to the terminal locale.) Externally, for each
A ∈ E , we then have a natural adjunction between Heyting algebras,
HomE(A,H) ⊤
τA //
iAτA 88 SubE(A)
iA
oo (3)
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defined by composition as indicated in the following diagram:
H
τ

⊣
A
77
// ΩE
i
OO .
Comparing (3) to (1), we note that in the case H = f∗ΩF for a geometric mor-
phism f : F → E we have:
HomE(A,H) = HomE(A, f∗ΩF) ∼= HomF(f
∗A,ΩF ) ∼= SubF(f
∗A),
as required.
In this way, the topos semantics formulated in terms of a geometric morphism
f : F → E gives rise to an example of the required “algebraic” structure (3), with
H = f∗ΩF , and the same semantics for first-order modal logic can also be defined
in terms of the latter. On the other hand, every algebraic model in E arises in
this way from a geometric morphism from a suitable topos F , namely the topos of
internal sheaves on H . Thus, as far as the interpretation of first-order logic goes,
the algebraic approach is equivalent to the geometric one (the latter restricted to
localic morphisms, which is really all that is relevant for the interpretation). The
advantage of the algebraic approach for higher -order logic will become evident in
what follows. To give just one example, we shall see how the interpretation results
in a key new (inherently topos-theoretic) treatment of equality which illuminates the
relation between modality and intensionality.
The goal of this paper is both to present the new idea of algebraic topos semantics
for higher-order modal logic and to revisit the accounts of first-order semantics that
are scattered in the literature, putting them into perspective from the point of view
of the unifying framework developed here. The question of completeness will be
addressed in a separate paper [3], extending the result in [2].
In the remainder of this paper, we first review the well-known topos semantics for
(intuitionistic) higher-order logic and describe the adjunction i ⊣ τ in some detail.
The second section then states the formal system of higher-order modal logic that is
considered here and gives the definition of its models. The third section discusses in
detail the failure of the standard extensionality principles and the soundness of the
modalized versions thereof. We then show how the semantics based on geometric
morphisms can be captured within the present, algebraic framework. The last section
states the representation theorem mentioned above.
For general background in topos theory (particularly for section 5) we refer the
reader to [9, 10, 14], and for background on higher-order type theory to [8, 9, 12].
We assume some basic knowledge of category-theoretical concepts, but will recall es-
sential definitions and proofs so as to make the paper more accessible. The algebraic
approach pursued here was first investigated by Hans-Jo¨rg Winkler and the first
author, and some of these results were already contained in [23]. Finally, we have
benefitted from many conversations with Dana Scott, whose ideas and perspective
have played an obvious role in the development of our approach.
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1 Frame-valued logic in a topos
Recall that a topos E is a cartesian closed category with equalizers and a subobject
classifier ΩE . The latter is defined as an object ΩE together with an isomorphism
SubE(A) ∼= HomE(A,ΩE), (4)
natural in A (w.r.t. pullback on the left, and precomposition on the right). Equiv-
alently, there is a distinguished monomorphism ⊤ : 1 → ΩE such that for each
subobject M ֌ A there is a unique map µ : A → ΩE for which M arises as the
pullback of ⊤ along µ:
M //


1
⊤

A µ
// ΩE
This definition determines ΩE up to isomorphism. The map µ is called the classifying
map of M . The category Sets is a topos with subobject classifier the two-element
set 2. The classifying maps are the characteristic functions of subsets of a given set
A. We list some further examples that will play a role later on.
Example 1.1. An important example is the subobject classifier in the topos of I-
indexed families of set, for some fixed set I; equivalently the functor category SetsI .
It is a functor Ω : I → Sets with components Ω(i) = 2.
The subobject classifier in SetsC
op
, for any small category C, is described as
follows. For any object C in C, Ω(C) is the set of all sieves σ on C, i.e. sets
of arrows h with codomain C such that h ∈ σ implies h ◦ f ∈ σ, for all f with
cod(f) = dom(h). For an arrow g : D → C in C, Ω(g)(σ) is the restriction of σ
along g:
Ω(g)(σ) = {f : X → D | g ◦ f ∈ σ},
which is a sieve on D. The mono ⊤ : 1 → Ω is the natural transformation whose
components pick out the maximal sieve ⊤C on C, i.e. the set of all arrows with
codomain C (the terminal object 1 being pointwise the singleton). The classifying
map χm of a subfunctor m : E ֌ F has components
(χm)C(a) = {f : X → C | F (f)(a) ∈ E(X)}.
In particular, if C is a preorder, then Ω(C) is the set of all downward closed subsets
of ↓ C. Since in this case there is at most one arrow g : D → C, the function F (g)
may be thought of as the restriction of the set F (C) to F (D) along the inequality
D ≤ C. 
Each ΩE is a complete Heyting algebra, internal in E . Generally, the notion of
Heyting algebra makes sense in any category with finite limits. It is an object H in
E with maps
1
⊤,⊥
// H H ×H
∧,∨,⇒
oo
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that provide the Heyting structure on H . These maps are to make certain diagrams
commute, corresponding to the usual equations defining a Heyting algebra. For
instance, commutativity of
H × 1
1×⊤
//
π1
%%▲
▲▲
▲▲
▲▲
▲▲
▲▲
H ×H
∧

H
corresponds to the axiom x ∧ ⊤ = x, for any x ∈ H . The correspondence between
the usual equational definition and commutative diagrams in a category C can be
made precise using the internal language of C [14].
The induced partial ordering on H is constructed as the equalizer
E // //H ×H
∧ //
π1
// H,
corresponding to the usual definition
x ≤ y iff x ∧ y = x.
The description of arbitrary joins and meets additionally requires the existence
of exponentials and is an internalization of how set-indexed joins and meets in set-
structures can be expressed via a suitable adjunction. For any object I in E , there
is an arrow
∆I : H −→ H
I
that is the result of applying the functor H(−) to the unique map I −→ 1E in E . In
detail, ∆I : H → H
I is the exponential transpose of π1 : H × I → H across the
adjunction (−) × I ⊣ (−)I . Set-theoretically, for any x ∈ H , ∆I(x)(i) = x, for all
i ∈ I. The object HI inherits a poset structure (in fact, a Heyting structure) from
H , which set-theoretically translates into the pointwise ordering.
I-indexed joins
∨
I and meets
∧
I are given by internal left and right adjoints
to ∆I , respectively. After all, joins and meets are coproducts and products in the
Heyting algebra H , and these can always be defined by adjoints in exactly that way,
regarding H as in internal category in E . This is analogous to externally defining
I-indexed products (coproducts) of families (Ai)i∈I of objects in a category C by
right (left) adjoints to the functor
∆I : C −→ C
I
Example 1.2. In case E = Sets, the right adjoint ∀I to ∆I is explicitly computed as
∀I(f) =
∨
{a ∈ H | ∆I(a) ≤ f}, (5)
following the standard description of the right adjoint to a map of complete join-
semilattices, in this case ∆I . In fact, it is not hard to see that
∀I(f) =
∧
i∈I
f(i).
The left adjoint ∃I ⊣ ∆I is described dually. 
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Example 1.3. An important case that will be useful later is where the category in
question is of the form SetsC
op
, for a small category C. Products in SetsC
op
are
computed pointwise. In particular, a Heyting algebra H in SetsC
op
has pointwise
natural structure. That is to say, each H(C), for C in C, is a Heyting algebra in such
a way that e.g. for all binary operations ⋆ on H , H(f) ◦ ⋆D = ⋆C ◦ (H(f)×H(f)),
for any arrow f : C → D in C. This is because the structure maps, being arrows in
SetsC
op
, are natural transformations. Naturality in particular means that for each
f : C → D in C, the map H(f) preserves the Heyting structure.
By contrast, exponentials are not computed pointwise but by the formulas
HI(C) = Hom(yC × I,H)
HI(f) : η 7→ η ◦ (yf × 1I),
where yC denotes the contravariant functor HomC(−, C). The induced Heyting
structure on HI is the pointwise one at each component. In particular, for any
η, µ : yC × I → H ,
η ≤ µ (in HI(C)) iff ηD ≤ µD, for each D ∈ C
iff ηD(f, b) ≤ µD(f, b) (in H(D)), for each f : D → C, b ∈ I(D).
Since we are mainly interested in adjoints between ordered structures, for any
two order-preserving maps η : H ⇆ G : µ between internal partial orderings H,G in
SetsC
op
, η ⊣ µ means that ηC ⊣ µC at each component C. That is to say
ηC(x) ≤ y iff x ≤ µC(y),
for all x ∈ H(C), y ∈ G(C).
The natural transformation ∆I : H → H
I (henceforth ∆) determines for each
x ∈ H(C) a natural transformation ∆C(x) : yC × I → H with components
∆C(x)D(f, a) = H(f)(x).
Its right adjoint ∀I : H
I → H (henceforth ∀) has components, for any η ∈ Hom(yC×
I,H),
∀C(η) =
∨
{s ∈ H(C) | H(f)(s) ≤ ηD(f, b), for all f : D → C, b ∈ I(D)},
where the join is taken in H(C). Dually, the left adjoint ∃ of ∆ has components
∃C(η) =
∧
{s ∈ H(C) | ηD(f, b) ≤ H(f)(s), for all f : D → C, b ∈ I(D)}.
(Note that for instance the condition on the underlying set of the join ∀C(η) expresses
that ∆C(s) ≤ η as elements in H
I(C), so these definitions are in accordance with
the general definition of right adjoints to ∆C given in the previous example.)
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Lastly, each H(C) really is a complete Heyting algebra in the usual sense of
having arbitrary set-indexed meets and joins (so the previous definitions of ∀ and ∃
actually make sense). For any set J , the right adjoint ∀J : H(C)
J −→ H(C) can be
found as follows. Consider the constant J-valued functor ∆J on C (and constant
value 1J on arrows in C). For any C in C, there is an isomorphism
HomSets(J,HC) ∼= HomĈ(yC ×∆J,H)
(natural in J and H). Given a function h : J → HC, define a natural transformation
νh : yC × ∆J → H to have components (νh)D(g, a) = H(g)f(a). Conversely,
given a natural transformation η on the right, define a function fη : J → HC by
fη(a) = ηC(1C , a). These assignments are mutually inverse. Moreover, the map that
results from composing ∆J : HC → H
∆J(C) with that isomorphism is computed as
f(∆C(x))(a) = ∆C(x)C(1C , a) = H(1C)(x) = x,
so that for any x ∈ HC, ∆C(x) is the constant x-valued map on J . This justifies
taking the right adjoint to ∆J as the sought right adjoint of the diagonal map
HC → H(C)J .
Indeed, for exponents ∆J the formula for the right adjoint to ∆C , for instance,
takes the familiar form met in the previous example
∀C(η) = ∀J(fη) =
∧
a∈J
fη(a) =
∧
a∈∆J(C)
ηC(1C , a),
or
∀J(h) = ∀C(νh) =
∧
a∈∆J(C)
(νh)C(1C, a) =
∧
a∈J
h(a),
respectively. 
For convenience, let us recall the Heyting structure of ΩE in more detail, as
it will be useful later on. It is uniquely determined by the natural isomorphism
(4) and the Yoneda lemma which “internalizes” the (complete) Heyting structure
of HomE(−,ΩE) (coming from SubE(−)) to ΩE . Since each pullback functor f
∗ :
Sub(B)→ Sub(A), for f : A→ B in E , preserves the Heyting structure on Sub(B),
all the required diagrams that define the Heyting operations on ΩE necessarily com-
mute.
The top element is ⊤ : 1 → ΩE , which by the previous considerations is the
classifying map of the identity on the terminal object. The bottom element is the
characteristic map of the monomorphism 0 ֌ 1, where 0 is the initial object of E .
Meets
∧ : ΩE × ΩE −→ ΩE
are given as the classifying map of 〈⊤,⊤〉 : 1 −→ ΩE × ΩE , which is the classifying
map of the pullback of 〈1,⊤u〉 and 〈⊤u, 1〉 (u : ΩE → 1 is the canonical map):
1 ⊤ //
⊤

ΩE
〈1,⊤u〉

ΩE
〈⊤u,1〉
// ΩE × ΩE
viewed as subobject of ΩE × ΩE ; while 〈1,⊤u〉 and 〈⊤u, 1〉 in turn arise as the
subobjects classified by π2 and π1, respectively. In a similar way, joins are constructed
as classifying map of the image of the map
[〈1,⊤uΩE 〉, 〈⊤uΩE , 1〉] : ΩE + ΩE −→ ΩE × ΩE .
Implication is given as the classifying map of the equalizer
E // // ΩE × ΩE
∧ //
π1
// ΩE .
The classifying map can be factored as follows, where the two squares are pullbacks:
E //


ΩE //
∆ΩE

1
⊤

ΩE × ΩE
〈∧,π1〉
// ΩE × ΩE δΩE
// ΩE
following a standard description of equalizers.1
Using the Yoneda principle one also obtains indexed meets and joins as adjoints
to the map ∆I : ΩE → Ω
I
E . They are essentially provided by the fact that, for any
topos E , and any arrow f : A→ B in E , the pullback functor
f ∗ : SubE(B) −→ SubE(A)
has both a right and a left adjoint. Adding a parameter X yields that
(1X × f)
∗ : SubE(X ×B) −→ SubE(X ×A)
restricts to a functor
HomE(X,Ω
B
E ) −→ HomE(X,Ω
A
E )
by the isomorphisms
SubE(X × Y ) ∼= HomE(X × Y,ΩE) ∼= HomE(X,Ω
Y
E ).
1Actually, the Yoneda argument determines ⇒ as the classifying map of the subobject
∀〈⊤uΩE ,1〉(⊤) of ΩE × ΩE , where the latter is precisely the said equalizer.
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These are natural in X and so by Yoneda provide a map
ΩBE −→ Ω
A
E ,
which is precisely ΩfE .
In particular, ∆I arises in this way from pullback along the projection π1 : X ×
I → X :
π∗1 : SubE(X) −→ SubE(X × I),
that is by applying the previous argument to the map uI : I −→ 1, as required. The
external adjoints of π∗1 induce the required internal adjoints of Ω
uI
E = ∆I .
As is well-known, one can interpret (intuitionistic) higher-order logic w.r.t. this
algebraic structure on ΩE [12, 14]. In particular, each formula Γ | ϕ, where Γ = (x1 :
A1, . . . , xn : An) is a suitable variable context for ϕ, is recursively assigned an arrow
JA1K× · · · × JAnK
JϕK
−−→ ΩE
in E . Connectives and quantifiers are interpreted by composing with the evident
Heyting structure maps of ΩE described above. For instance, Jx : A | ∀y.ϕK is the
arrow
JAK
λJBKJϕK
−−−−→ Ω
JBK
E
∀JBK
−−→ ΩE ,
where λJBKJϕK is the exponential transpose of
JϕK : JAK× JBK −→ ΩE .
In particular, the equality predicate on each type M is interpreted as the classifying
map δJMK of the diagonal
〈1JMK, 1JMK〉 : JMK −→ JMK × JMK.
Example 1.4. When E = Sets, and ΩSets = 2, then the right adjoint ∀I to ∆I : 2→
2I is by definition required to satisfy
∆I(x) ≤ f iff x ≤ ∀I(f),
which holds just in case ∀I satisfies
∀I(f) = 1 iff f(i) = 1, for all i ∈ I.
Equivalently,
∀I(S) = 1 iff S = I,
where S ⊆ I. Given a formula x : X | ϕ, and an interpretation JXK
JϕK
−−→ 2, then
λJXKJϕK : 1 → 2
JXK picks out the subset S of JXK whose characteristic map is JϕK,
i.e. the set of objects in JXK that satisfy ϕ. Thus J∀x.ϕK = 1 if and only if S = JXK,
as expected. 
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In principle, these definitions make sense for any Heyting algebra H in E in place
of ΩE , except for interpreting equality, since there is no notion of classifying map
available for arbitrary H . We present below a way in general to canonically interpret
equality for arbitrary H , closely connected to the treatment of modal operators.
Definition 1.1. In any topos E , a frame H in E is a complete Heyting algebra
H in E . A frame homomorphism f : H → G is a map f in E that is internally∨
,∧-preserving.
For instance in any topos E the object 1 + 1 is an internal Boolean algebra, and
thus a frame. Here, τ : 1 + 1→ ΩE is the classifying map of the first coprojection.
Example 1.5. The prototypical frame is the collection of open sets O(X) of a topo-
logical space X . The set O(X) is a complete Heyting algebra, as is P(X). However,
arbitrary meets in O(X) are in general not mere intersections. That is to say, the
inclusion
i : O(X) →֒ P(X)
does not preserve them. This exhibitsO(X) as a subframe of P(X) rather than a sub-
Heyting algebra. The example also illustrates why the notion frame homomorphism
matters at all. Note also that every frame map f : H → G has a right adjoint f∗,
defined for any y ∈ G as
f∗(y) =
∨
{x ∈ H | f(x) ≤ y}. (6)
The right adjoint to the inclusion i is the interior operation on the topological space
X , which determines, in accordance with the formula for f∗, the largest open subset
(w.r.t. X) of an arbitrary subset of X .
A related and more elementary example is the set inclusion 3 →֒ 4 of the three
element Heyting algebra into the four element Boolean algebra, as indicated in:
11 11
10
aa❇❇❇❇❇❇❇❇
→֒ 01
==⑤⑤⑤⑤⑤⑤⑤⑤
10
aa❇❇❇❇❇❇❇❇
00
==⑤⑤⑤⑤⑤⑤⑤⑤
00
aa❇❇❇❇❇❇❇❇
==⑤⑤⑤⑤⑤⑤⑤⑤
(3may be thought of as the open set structure of the Sierpin´ski space.) The inclusion
does not preserve the implication 10→ 00:
10→ 00 = 00, in 3
while
10→ 00 = 01, in 4.
Since i preserving arbitrary meets is equivalent to saying that i preserves implica-
tions, 3 is included in 4 as a subframe rather than as a sub-Heyting algebra. 
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In a topos E the frame ΩE plays a distinguished role:
Lemma 1.2. In any topos E , the subobject classifier ΩE is the initial frame. That is
to say, for every frame H in E , there is a unique frame map i : ΩE −→ H. Moreover,
the right adjoint τ of i is the classifying map of the top element ⊤H : 1 −→ H of H.
We refer to [9] (C1.3) for the proof.
We will mainly be interested in those frames H for which the map i : ΩE → H is
monic, to which we will refer as faithful.2 This map i : ΩE → H will play a crucial role
both in modelling equality and the modal operator on H . Looking ahead, suppose
given a suitable (intuitionistic) higher-order modal theory (as in section 2). Then
we shall interpret equality on a type A w.r.t. an H-valued model in a topos E as the
composite of i with the usual classifying map of equality:
JAK× JAK
δJAK
−−→ ΩE
i
−→ H.
The semantics thus obtained is not sound w.r.t. standard higher-order intuitionistic
logic; in particular, function and propositional extensionality fail (as we shall show
by providing counterexamples). On the other hand, one can restore soundness by
taking into account the following naturally arising modal operator.
Lemma 1.3. Given a frame H in a topos E , let i ⊣ τ be the canonical adjunction
described in lemma 1.2,
i : ΩE ⇆ H : τ.
The composite i ◦ τ is then an S4 modality on H.
Proof. The composite i ◦ τ preserves finite meets because both components do. In
virtue of i ⊣ τ , the composite is a comonad, which gives the S4 laws.
2 Higher-order intuitionistic S4
The formal system of higher-order modal logic considered here is simply the union of
the usual axioms for higher-order logic and S4. The higher-order part is a version of
type theory (cf. [8, 9, 12]). Types and terms are defined recursively. A higher-order
language L consists of a collection of basic types A,B, . . . along with basic terms
(constants) a : A, b : B. To stay close to topos-theoretic formulations, we assume the
following type and term forming operations that inductively specify the collection of
types and terms of the language:
• There are basic types 1, P
• If A, B are types, then there is a type A×B
2A frameH is faithful in this sense iff the inverse image part of the canonical geometric morphism
ShE(H) −→ E is faithful (see section 5).
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• If A, B are types, then there is a type AB
Terms are recursively constructed as follows. Here we assume, for every type
A, an infinite set of variables of type A, written as x : A, to be given. We follow
[8] in writing Γ | t : B, for Γ = (x1 : A1, . . . , xn : An), involving at least all the
free variables in the term t. A context Γ may also be empty. Formally, every term t
always occurs in some variable context Γ and is well-typed only w.r.t. such a context.
This is important to understand the recursive clauses below. To simplify notation,
however, we omit Γ if it is unspecified and the same throughout a recursive clause.
• There are distinguished terms ∅ | ∗ : 1 and ∅ | ⊤,⊥ : P
• If t : A and s : B are terms, then 〈t, s〉 : A×B is a term
• If t : A× B is a term, then there are terms π1t : A and π2t : B
• If Γ | t : A is a term and y : B a variable in Γ, then there is a term Γ[y : B] |
λy.t : AB; where Γ[y : B] is the context that results from Γ by deleting y : B.
• If t : AB and s : B are terms, then app(t, s) : A is a term.
• For any two terms t : P, s : P there are terms t ∧ s : P, t ∨ s : P, t⇒ s : P.
• If Γ, y : B | t : P is a term, then Γ | ∀y.t : P is a term; and similarly for
Γ | ∃y.t : P
• If t : A and s : A are terms, then s =A t : P is a term.
• If t : P is a term, then t : P is a term.
One also assumes the usual structural rules of weakening of the variable context
(adding dummy variables), contraction, and permutation. We may also assume that
each variable declaration occurs only once in a context.
As usual, we define a deductive system by specifying a relation ⊢ between terms
of type P. The crucial difference between the standard formulation of intuitionistic
higher-order logic and the present one are the modified extensionality principles
marked with (∗).
• ϕ ⊢ ϕ
•
ϕ ⊢ ψ t : A
ϕ[t/x] ⊢ ψ[t/x]
, for x : A (similarly for simultaneous substitution)
•
ϕ ⊢ ψ ψ ⊢ ϑ
ϕ ⊢ ϑ
• ⊤ ⊢ x =A x, where x : A
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• ϕ ∧ x =A x
′ ⊢ ϕ[x′/x]. where x : A, x′ : A
(∗) ∀x(f(x) =B g(x)) ⊢ f =BA g, for terms x : A and f, g : B
A
(∗) (p⇔ q) ⊢ p =P q, for terms p, q : P
• ⊤ ⊢ ∗ =1 x, where x : 1
• ⊤ ⊢ π1〈x, y〉 =A x and ⊤ ⊢ π2〈x, y〉 =B y, where x : A and y : B
• ⊤ ⊢ 〈π1w, π2w〉 =A×B w, for w : A×B
• Γ[x : A] | ⊤ ⊢ app(λx.t, x′) =B t[x
′/x], for Γ | t : B and x′ : A
• ⊤ ⊢ λx.app(w, x) =BA w, for w : B
A
• ϕ ⊢ ⊤, for any ϕ : P
• ⊥ ⊢ ϕ, for any ϕ : P
• ϕ ⊢ ψ ∧ ϑ iff ϕ ⊢ ψ and ϕ ⊢ ϑ
• ϕ ∨ ψ ⊢ ϑ iff ϕ ⊢ ϑ and ψ ⊢ ϑ
• ϕ ⊢ ψ ⇒ ϑ iff ϕ ∧ ψ ⊢ ϑ
• Γ | ∃x.ϕ ⊢ ψ iff Γ, x : A | ϕ ⊢ ψ
• Γ | ϕ ⊢ ∀x.ψ iff Γ, x : A | ϕ ⊢ ψ
Definition 2.1. A theory in a language L as specified above consists of a set of
closed sentences α, i.e. terms of type P with no free variables (well-typed in the
empty context), and which may be used as axioms in the form Γ | ⊤ ⊢ α.
Remark 2.2. Adding the axiom
Γ | ⊤ ⊢ ∀p.p ∨ ¬p
makes the logic classical.
As is well-known there are more concise formulations of higher-order systems.
The particular one chosen here is very close to the definition of a topos as a cartesian
closed category with subobject classifier. One does not really need all exponential
types and their constructors, however, but only those of the form PA, for every type
A, which we write PA and call powertypes. Along these lines one may define:
{x : A | ϕ} :≡ λx.ϕ : PA,
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where x : A | ϕ : P. On the other hand, for σ : PA and x : A, set
x ∈ σ :≡ app(σ, x).
According to the axioms for exponential terms, we have
x′ : A | ⊤ ⊢ x′ ∈ {x : A | ϕ} = ϕ[x′/x]
| ⊤ ⊢ {x : A | x ∈ w} = w.
Thus one could instead take only types of the form PA, and the constructors {· · · | −}
and ∈ as basic, along with the last two axioms. For further simplifications see [9, 12].
Finally, the S4 axioms are the usual ones
•
Γ | ϕ ⊢ ψ
Γ | ϕ ⊢ ψ
• Γ | ⊤ ⊢ ⊤
• Γ | ϕ ∧ψ ⊢ (ϕ ∧ ψ)
• Γ | ϕ ⊢ ϕ
• Γ | ϕ ⊢ ϕ
The first three axioms express that , viewed as an operator, is a monotone
finite meet preserving operation. The other two axioms are the T and 4 axioms,
respectively. Further useful rules provable from the axioms are necessitation
Γ | ⊤ ⊢ ϕ
Γ | ⊤ ⊢ ϕ
,
and the axiom K:
Γ | (ϕ⇒ ψ) ⊢ ϕ⇒ ψ.
Although it is essentially obvious, for the sake of completeness we provide a definition
of a model of this language in a topos.
Definition 2.3. A model of a higher-order modal type theory in a topos E consists
of a faithful frame H in E , and an assignment J−K that assigns to each basic type A
in L an object JAK in such a way that
• J1K = 1E
• JPK = H
• JA× BK = JAK× JBK
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• JABK = JAKJBK.
Moreover, each term Γ | t : B in L, where Γ = (x1 : A1, . . . , xn : An) is a suitable
variable context for t, is assigned an arrow
JtK : JΓK → JBK
recursively as follows (where JΓK is short for JA1K× · · · × JAnK and JtK really means
JΓ | t : BK).
• Each constant c : A in L is assigned an arrow
JcK : 1E → JAK.
In particular:
J⊤K = ⊤H : 1E −→ H
J⊥K = ⊥H : 1E −→ H
J∗ : 1K = 11E (the identity arrow on the terminal object).
This extends to arbitrary terms-in-context as follows
• For any constant c : A, JΓ | c : AK is the arrow
JΓK
u
−→ 1E
JcK
−→ JAK
• If Γ | s : A and Γ | t : B are terms, then JΓ | 〈s, t〉 : A× BK is the map
〈JsK, JtK〉 : JΓK → JAK× JBK.
• If Γ | t : A×B is a term, then JΓ | π1t : AK is
JΓK
JtK
−→ JAK× JBK
π1−→ JAK,
and similarly for π2t.
• If Γ | t : A is a term and y : B a variable in Γ, then JΓ[y : B] | λy.t : ABK is
λJBKJtK : JΓ[y : B]K → A
JBK
• If Γ | t : AB and Γ | s : B are terms, then JΓ | app(t, s) : AK is
〈JtK, JsK〉 : JΓK → AB ×B
ε
−→ A.
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• For any two terms Γ | p : P, Γ | q : P, and ⋆ any of the connectives ∧,∨,⇒,
JΓ | p ⋆ q : PK is
JΓK
〈JpK,JqK〉
−−−−→ H ×H
⋆
−→ H,
where in the last line ⋆ is the evident algebraic operation on H.
• If Γ, y : B | t : P is a term, then JΓ | ∀y.t : PK is
JΓK
λJBKJtK
−−−−→ HJBK
∀JBK
−−→ H
and similarly for JΓ | ∃y.t : PK via ∃JBK.
• If Γ | t : A and Γ | s : A are terms, then JΓ | t =A s : PK is the map
JΓK
〈JtK,JsK〉
−−−−→ JAK× JAK
δJAK
−−→ ΩE
i
−→ H,
where i is the unique (monic) frame map.
• If Γ | t : P is a term, then JΓ | t : PK is the map
JΓK
JtK
−→ H
τ
−→ ΩE
i
−→ H,
where τ is the classifying map of ⊤H : 1→ H, as described before.
Before moving on, let us review some common examples
Examples 2.1.
1. A well-studied class of examples are structures induced by surjective geometric
morphisms f : F → E . If F is Boolean, then so is f∗ΩF . For instance, there
are geometric morphisms
Sets|C| −→ SetsC
induced by the inclusion |C| → C. When C is a preorder, then this yields
Kripke semantics for first-order modal logic. This case was originally studied
in [6, 22].
Similarly, the canonical geometric morphism
Sets/X −→ Sh(X)
induced by the continuous inclusion |X| →֒ X gives rise to sheaf models for
classical first- (and higher-) order modal logic, studied in [1]. The exact struc-
ture of these examples will be discussed in more detail in section 4 below.
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2. More generally, by a well-known theorem of Barr, every Grothendieck topos
G can be covered by a Boolean topos B in the sense that there is a surjective
geometric morphism
f : B −→ G.
For H = f∗ΩB, this provides models in Grothendieck topoi.
3
3. Of course, in any topos E the subobject classifier ΩE itself would do. However,
as noted e.g. in [18, 20], the resulting modal operator will be the identity on ΩE .
3 Soundness of algebraic semantics
The given system of intuitionistic higher-order S4 modal logic is sound w.r.t. the se-
mantics described in def. 2.3. Except for the two extensionality principles, soundness
is straightforward following known topos semantics. The reason why plain propo-
sitional extensionality fails in our semantics is the interpretation of implication. In
the general topos semantics based on ΩE Heyting implication on ΩE is given by the
map
ΩE × ΩE
〈π1,∧〉
−−−→ ΩE × ΩE
δ
−→ ΩE
that immediately implies propositional extensionality. By contrast, for an arbitrary
frame H we observe:
Lemma 3.1. For an arbitrary topos E , and a (faithful) frame H in E , it is not in
general the case that
H ×H ⇒ //
〈π1,∧〉

H
H ×H
δH // ΩE
i
OO
commutes.
Proof. A counterexample may easily be found in the topos Sets with subobject
classifier 2 and H = P(X), for some set X 6= 1. The adjunction
i : 2⇆ P(X) : τ
(i ⊣ τ) is defined by
i(x) =
{
X, if x = 1
∅, if x = 0
and
τ(U) = 1 iff U = X.
3Cf. e.g. [14], IX.9. Actually, the geometric morphism f can be extended to a surjective
geometric morphism E −→ B −→ G, where E is the topos of sheaves on a topological space,
although E might not be Boolean ([14], IX.11).
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For any U, V ∈ P(X),
U ⇒ V =
⋃
{W ∈ P(X) | W ∩ U ⊆ V }.
If U * V , then U 6= U ∩ V , and so
iδ〈π1,∧〉(U, V ) = iδP(X)(U, U ∩ V ) = i(0) = ∅.
But U * V does not in general imply U ⇒ V = ∅. (Consider e.g. V ⊆ U ⇒ V , for
U ∩ V 6= ∅.)
As suggested by the example, the reason for the failure of plain propositional
extensionality is that failure to be true (in the sense of ⊤ = X * U ⇒ V ) does not
imply equality to ⊥ in H . On the other hand, note that τ(U ⇒ V ) = 0, because
X * U ⇒ V . This observation generalizes. Although iδ〈π1,∧〉 = ⇒ fails in general,
we have the following.
Lemma 3.2. In any topos E , the diagram
H ×H ⇒ //
〈π1,∧〉

H
τ

H ×H
δH // ΩE
commutes, and thus
iτ◦ ⇒ = iδH〈π1,∧〉.
Proof. Consider the pullbacks
(≤) //

1
⊤

1
⊤

H ×H ⇒ // H τ
// ΩE
(≤) //

H //
∆

1
⊤

H ×H
〈π1,∧〉
// H ×H
δH
// ΩE
whence the claim follows from uniqueness of classifying maps. The left-hand square
in the first diagram is a pullback by the definition of⇒, while the second diagram is
the definition of the induced partial ordering on H as the equalizer of π1 and ∧.
This argument neatly exhibits the conceptual role played by the modal operator τ
(more exactly, the adjunction i ⊣ τ). The soundness proof is essentially a corollary
to that.
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Corollary 3.3. Modalized propositional extensionality
p : P, q : P | (p⇔ q) ⊢ p =P q
is true in any model (E , H).
Proof. In view of lemma 3.2, and since τ, i commute with meets, the left-hand side
of the above sequent is interpreted as the map
i ∧ (δH × δH)〈〈∧H , π1〉, 〈∧H , π2〉〉,
with ∧ the meet on ΩE . The right-hand side is the internal equality on H :
iδH : H ×H → ΩE → H.
It is clear from the properties of ≤Ω as a partial ordering that
∧(δH × δH)〈〈∧H , π1〉, 〈∧H , π2〉〉 ≤Ω δH .
Since i preserves that ordering, we have
i ∧ (δH × δH)〈〈∧H , π1〉, 〈∧H , π2〉〉 ≤H iδH .
The failure of plain function extensionality and its recovering via τ can be an-
alyzed in a similar fashion. For non-modal function extensionality in the standard
ΩE -valued setting essentially holds because ∀Y ◦ (δX)
Y = δXY . However, in our
setting we don’t in general have ∀Y ◦ (iδX)
Y = iδXY , but rather:
Lemma 3.4. For any topos E , and any faithful frame in H, the following diagram
commutes:
ΩY
iY // HY
τY

∀Y // H
τ

XY ×XY
(δX)
Y
OO
(δX)
Y
//
δ
XY
;;Ω
Y ∀Y // Ω
Hence in particular
iδXY = iτ ◦ ∀Y ◦ (iδX)
Y .
Proof. The right-hand square of the diagram commutes by uniqueness of classifying
maps, while for the left-hand square we have τi = 1. Similarly, the bottom triangle
commutes, because
XY
∆
XY

// 1
⊤Y

1
⊤

XY ×XY
(δX )
Y
// ΩY
∀Y
// Ω
is a pullback diagram. (Note that the left-hand square is a pullback, because the
functor (−)Y , as a right adjoint, preserves these.)
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Corollary 3.5. Modal function extensionality
f : XY , g : XY | (∀y : Y.f(y) =X g(y)) ⊢ f =XY g.
is true in any interpretation (E , H).
Proof. The left-hand side of the sequent is interpreted by the arrow
XY ×XY
λY (iδX 〈evπ13,evπ23〉)
−−−−−−−−−−−−→ HY
∀Y−→ H

−→ H,
where the projections come from XY × XY × Y , and ev : XY × Y → X is the
canonical evaluation. The right-hand side is simply
XY ×XY
δ
XY−−→ ΩE
i
−→ H.
We need to show that the arrow
〈iτ∀Y λY (iδX〈evπ13, evπ23〉), iδXY 〉 : X
Y ×XY → H ×H
factors through the partial ordering (≤)֌ H ×H . Write the left-hand component
as iϕ. It is enough to show that
ϕ ≤Ω δXY : X
Y ×XY ,
whence the claim follows as before, i being order-preserving.
To show that the subobject (Q,m) classified by the map τ∀Y λY (iδX〈evπ13, evπ23〉)
factors through ∆XY , as subobjects ofX
Y×XY , observe first that λY (iδX〈evπ13, evπ23〉)
can be written as
XY ×XY
η
−→ (XY ×XY × Y )Y
〈evπ13,evπ23〉Y
−−−−−−−−→ (X ×X)Y
(δX)
Y
−−−→ ΩY
iY
−→ HY ,
where η is the unit component (at XY ×XY ) of the product-exponential adjunction
(−)× Y ⊣ (−)Y . By the previous lemma
τ ◦ ∀Y ◦ i
Y ◦ (δX)
Y = δXY .
The subobject in question thus arises from pullbacks
Q

m

// XY //
∆
XY

1
⊤

XY ×XY
〈evπ13,evπ23〉Y ◦η
// XY ×XY
δ
XY // Ω
But 〈evπ13, evπ23〉
Y ◦ η is the identity arrow. For it is the transpose (along the
adjunction (−)× Y ⊣ (−)Y ) of
〈evπ13, evπ23〉 : X
Y ×XY × Y → X ×X.
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The latter in turn is the canonical evaluation of XY ×XY viewed as the exponential
(X ×X)Y , i.e. the counit of the adjunction at X ×X , transposing which yields the
identity. As a result,
τ∀Y λY (iδX〈evπ13, evπ23〉) ≤Ω δXY ,
and therefore
iτ∀Y λY (iδX〈evπ13, evπ23〉) ≤H iδXY .
Remark 3.6. Before giving a counterexample to iδXY = ∀Y ◦ (iδX)
Y , let us remark
that the equation does actually hold in the topos Sets. For consider f 6= g ∈ XY ,
i.e. f(y) 6= g(y), for some y ∈ Y . Then for any complete Heyting algebra H , the
function (iδX)
Y (f, g) ∈ HY is defined as
(iδX)
Y (f, g)(y) = iδX(f(y), g(y)) = ⊤, if f(y) = g(y),
and ⊥ otherwise. Thus taking the meet (cf. the definition in example 1.2) yields∧
y∈Y
(iδX)
Y (f, g)(y) = ⊥,
because f(y) 6= g(y), for some y ∈ Y , by assumption. In turn the meet equals ⊤
just in case f(y) = g(y), for all y ∈ Y , i.e. if and only if f = g.
Proposition 3.7. It is not in general the case that for a topos E and a frame H
in E :
iδXY = ∀Y ◦ (iδX)
Y .
Proof. To find a counterexample we consider a specific presheaf topos SetsC
op
de-
scribed below.4 Let’s first recall some general facts. Write Ω|C| for the subobject
classifier in Sets|C| and choose H = f∗Ω|C| (henceforth Ω∗), where f is the geometric
morphism f : Sets|C| → SetsC
op
induced by the inclusion |C| →֒ C via right Kan
extensions. Recall moreover from the beginning that the subobject classifier Ω of
SetsC
op
determines for each C the set of all sieves on C. By contrast, Ω∗(C) is the
set of arbitrary sets of arrows with codomain C (cf. also the example from the next
section).
Recall that in any category of the form SetsC
op
the evaluation maps ε : BA×A→
B have components
εC(η, a) = ηC(1C , a),
where η ∈ BA(C) = Hom(yC × A,B) and a ∈ A(C). The exponential transpose
α : Z → BA of a map α : Z ×A→ B has components
αC(z) = α ◦ (ζ × 1A), (7)
4The counterexample, in particular the choice of C and the functor G : C→ Sets below, follows
a slightly different, though equivalent, proof first given in [23].
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where ζ : yC → Z corresponds under the Yoneda lemma to the element z ∈ Z(C),
i.e. is defined as ζ(f) = Z(f)(z), for any f ∈ yC(D).
For any object A in C, the functor (−)A acts on arrows f : C → D as
fA = f ◦ ε,
for evaluation ε : CA ×A→ C. In particular,
(iδB)
A = iδB ◦ ε,
for ε : (B × B)A ×A→ B ×B evaluation at A. Thus, for any pair
〈η, µ〉 ∈ (B ×B)A(C) = Hom(yC × A,B ×B),
we have
(iδB ◦ ε)C(η, µ) = iδBε(〈η, µ〉
∗ × 1A) = iδB〈η, µ〉.
Here we use that 〈η, µ〉∗ : yC → (B×B)A corresponds under Yoneda to the element
〈η, µ〉 ∈ (B × B)A(C) = Hom(yC × A,B × B) and that 〈η, µ〉∗ is equal to the
exponential transpose of 〈η, µ〉. Accordingly,
∀C(iδB)
A
C(η, µ) = ∀C(iδB ◦ ε)C(η, µ)
= ∀C(iδB〈η, µ〉)
=
⋃
{s ∈ Ω∗(C) | Ω∗(g)(s) ≤ iD(δB)D(ηD(g, b), µD(g, b)), for all
(g : D → C, b ∈ A(D))},
On the other hand, the classifying map of the diagonal on a functor B : Cop →
Sets is computed as
(δB)C(x, y) = {f : D → C | B(f)(x) = B(f)(y)},
for all pairs (x, y) ∈ B(C) × B(C). It is the maximal sieve ⊤C on C just in case
x = y.
Now let C be the finite category
C
g
−→ D,
and define a functor G : Cop → Sets as follows:5
G(D) = {u}, G(C) = {v, w}, G(g)(u) = v.
Furthermore, choose η, µ ∈ GG(D) such that η 6= µ. Observe that, while necessarily
ηD = µD : yD(D)×G(D)→ G(D)
5Although g : C → D may be seen as the two-element poset with resulting presheaf topos
Sets→, we will not need that description. The objects and arrows in C merely play the role of
indices, so it seems better to use the more neutral notation C,D, g.
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with assignment
(1D, u) 7→ u,
we can chose η, µ in such a way that ηC(g, x) 6= µC(g, x), for some pair (g, x) ∈
yD(C)× G(C). Specifically, since the first component g is fixed, the choice is only
about x ∈ G(C) which in turn must concern w ∈ G(C). For naturality requires that
G(g)ηD(1D, u) = ηC(yD(g)×G(g))C(1D, u) = ηC(g, v),
so that since G(g)ηD(1D, u) = G(g)(u) = v, we must have ηC(g, v) = v; similarly
µC(g, v) = v. However, no constraint is put on the values ηC(g, w) and µC(g, w),
respectively.
Then:
(δGG)D(η, µ) = {x : X → D | G
G(x)(η) = GG(x)(µ)} = ∅. (8)
For if x = g, observe
GG(g)(η) = η ◦ (yg × 1G) 6= µ ◦ (yg × 1G) = G
G(g)(µ),
because
ηC(yg × 1G)C(1C, w) = ηC(g, w) 6= µC(g, w) = µC(yg × 1G)C(1C , w),
where the inequality holds by construction. But also, if x = 1D, then G
G(x)(η) =
η 6= µ = GG(x)(µ), where the inequality holds by assumption again.
On the other hand,
∀D(iδG)
G
D(η, µ) =
⋃
{s ∈ Ω∗(D) | Ω∗(x)(s) ≤ iX(δG)X(ηX(x, b), µX(x, b))} = {1D}.
(9)
for all pairs (x : X → D, b ∈ G(X)) from C. It is clear that s = {1D} satisfies the
condition on the underlying set of the union, since for x = 1D,
Ω∗(1D)({1D}) = {1D}
⊆ ⊤D = iD(δG)D(ηD(1D, u), µD(1D, u)).
On the other hand, for x = g, it is trivially always the case that
Ω∗(g)({1D}) = ∅ ⊆ (δG)C(ηC(g, b), µC(g, b)),
for all b ∈ G(C).
Furthermore, note that if g ∈ s, for some s ∈ Ω∗(D), then
Ω∗(g)(s) = ⊤C = {1C}.
So if g ∈ s, for some s in the underlying set of the union (9), we had to have
⊤C = Ω∗(g)(s) ≤ iC(δG)C(ηC(g, b), µC(g, b)),
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for all b ∈ G(C). However, since by assumption ηC(g, w) 6= µC(g, w),
(δG)C(ηC(g, w), µC(g, w)) = ∅,
and so
Ω∗(g)(s)  iC(δG)C(ηC(g, w), µC(g, w)).
Thus g /∈ s, for all s ∈ Ω∗(D) in the underlying set of ∀D(iδG)
G
D(η, µ). Therefore
∀D(iδG)
G
D(η, µ) = {1D},
as claimed, and in contrast to (8):
iD(δGG)D(η, µ) = ∅.
(Of course, τ({1D}) = ∅, as lemma 3.4 predicts.)
Remark 3.8. There is an alternative, more combinatorial way of presenting the pre-
vious proof. The idea is to formulate the proof in terms of loop graphs rather than
presheaves. For presheaves on the category {C
g
−→ D} can equivalently be regarded
as labelled graphs that consist only of loops and points, for instance:
•a
c
•b
Here, G(D) is the set of edges and G(C) the set of vertices, while G(g) assigns to an
edge a point, its “source”. Thus every loop has a unique source but each point may
admit several edges on it. Ω is the following graph which is easily seen to classify
subgraphs:
•1
11
10
•0
00
The labelling expresses the imposed algebraic structure of Ω with 0 < 1 and xy ≤
uv iff x ≤ u & y ≤ v. Intuitively, in presheaf terms, 1 stands for the maximal
sieve on C and 0 for the empty sieve; similarly pairs xy encode sieves on D, where
x = 1 if and only if g is the sieve and y = 1 if and only if 1D is in it. Then the
source of an edge xy is just x. For instance, the sieve {g} on D is encoded by 10.
Then Ω(g)({g}) = {1C} which is encoded by 1. Note also that the set of edges is
the three-element Heyting algebra from example 1.5.
By contrast Ω∗ is the graph
•1
11
10
•0
00
01
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Here the additional edge 01 corresponds to the fact that {1D} ∈ Ω∗(D). Thus the
set of edges is the four-element Boolean algebra with the source map 22 → 2 induced
by the inclusion 1 →֒ 2.
The functor G from before becomes the graph
•v
u
•w
while GG is
•vv
θ1
•vw
θ0
•wv •ww
The graph ΩG then looks like this:
•11
111
110
•10
101
100
•01
010
•00
000
again with the pointwise ordering.6
The graph ΩG∗ is:
•11
111
110
•10
101
100
•01
011
010
•00
000
001
The vertices are the four element Boolean algebra 22 with the pointwise ordering,
and the same for the edges 23. The source map xyz 7→ xy is the map 23 → 22 induced
by the inclusion 2 →֒ 3 that projects out the first two arguments of an element of 23.
6The labelling can of course systematically be translated into one such that e.g. edges are labelled
by natural transformations η : yD×G→ Ω as before. For any such η is uniquely determined by the
values ηD(1D, u) and ηC(g, w). Vertices are just 2
2, as there are exactly four natural transformations
yC ×G→ Ω, each one defined by the pair xy of values of the component at a (Ω(C) = 2). Their
intuitive meaning in terms of sieves on D is as before. In turn, the notation xyz is chosen in such a
way that the source is xy. Thus, xyz is to be read so as to mean ηD(1D, u) = xz and ηC(g, w) = y.
For by definition the source of an edge η in ΩG is ΩG(g)(η) = η(yg × 1G). Its component at D is
empty while for C, and x = v
ηC((yg)C × 1GC)(1C , v) = ηC(g, v) = ηC(yD(g)×G(g))(1D, u) = g
∗ηD(1D, u),
where the last identity holds by naturality of η. Thus the source is the pair (g∗ηD(1D, u), ηC(g, w)).
In turn, g∗ηD(1D, u) is the first digit of ηD(1D, u). Moreover, in the expression xyz, y = 1 iff 1C ∈
ηC(g, w). So the source of xyz is xy.
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As it turns out, for δG : (G×G)G → ΩG:
(δG)D(θ0, θ1) = 101.
On the other hand, ∆C(x) = xx and ∆D(xy) = xxy, and so
∀D(xyz) =
∨
{st ∈ Ω∗(D) | sst ≤ xyz},
and similarly for Ω. Thus ∀D(101) =
∨
{00, 01} = 01, for ∀D : Ω
G
∗ (D) → Ω∗(D),
while ∀D(101) =
∨
{00} = 00, for ∀D : Ω
G(D)→ Ω(D).
Note finally that function extensionality is valid in constant domain models. (See
next section for the connection between topos semantics and Kripke models.) For
instance, consider a loop graph where G(D) ∼= 2 ∼= G(C). An element in ΩG(D), as
a natural transformation ηD : yD × G → Ω, is completely determined by the two
values ηD(1, a), ηD(1, b), for {a, b} = G(D). Thus, edges in Ω
G can be represented by
sequences xyzw, where xy and zw are the respective edges ηD(1, a) and ηD(1, b) in
Ω(D), using the binary notation from before. The source of an edge xyzw is xz. On
the other hand, the map ∆D : Ω(D) → Ω
G(D) can be computed as ∆D(st) = stst.
Now note that there can be no edge in ΩG of the form xy01 or 01zw, because 01 is
not an edge in Ω (moreover that’s the only difference between ΩG and ΩG∗ ). As a
result, there is no edge in ΩG such that applying ∀ to it is different from applying ∀
to that same edge in ΩG∗ . For the only reason this might happen is because 01 is in
the underlying set of the join
∀D(xyzw) =
∨
{st ∈ Ω∗(D) | stst ≤ xyzw}.
However, if 0101 ≤ xyzw, for any edge xyzw in ΩG, then xyzw = 1111. But certainly
∀ has the same value on 1111 for both ΩG and ΩG∗ . Although the argument is for
models with domain of cardinality 2, it easily generalizes to any n.
4 Algebraic semantics from geometric morphisms
The canonical example of a model in the sense of def. 2.3 is the case where H = f∗ΩF ,
for a surjective geometric morphism f : F → E [5, 15, 17, 19]. We will continue to
describe it in some detail to show that the known semantics for it really coincides
with the one described in section 2, the crucial thing to check being the equality
relation. To ease notation, we write A∗ for f ∗A, A∗ for f∗A and Ω∗ for f∗ΩF , if f is
understood.
Proposition 4.1. For any geometric morphism f : F → E , the object Ω∗ is a
complete Heyting algebra in E .
Proof. The object Ω∗ is a Heyting algebra under the image of f∗, since f∗ preserves
products. The same algebraic structure is equivalently determined through Yoneda
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by the external Heyting operations on each SubF(A
∗) under the natural isomor-
phisms
SubF(A
∗) ∼= HomF(A
∗,ΩF) ∼= HomE(A,Ω∗).
Completeness means that Ω∗ has I-indexed joins and meets, for any object I in
E . One way to see this is to first note that there are isomorphisms (natural in E)
Hom(E, (Ω∗)
I) ∼= Hom(E × I,Ω∗) ∼= Hom(E
∗ × I∗,ΩF ) ∼= Hom(E
∗,ΩI
∗
F ),
where we use that f ∗ preserves finite limits. Composition with
∀I∗ : Ω
I∗
F −→ ΩF
hence yields a function
Hom(E, (Ω∗)
I)
∼=
−→ Hom(E∗,ΩI
∗
F )
∀I∗◦(−)−−−−→ Hom(E∗,ΩF )
∼=
−→ Hom(E,Ω∗),
all natural in E. Thus, by the Yoneda lemma, there is a unique map
∀I : (Ω∗)
I −→ Ω∗
such that the function
Hom(E, (Ω∗)
I) −→ Hom(E,Ω∗)
from above is induced by composition with ∀I .
∀I is indeed right adjoint to ∆I : Ω∗ → Ω
I
∗. For ∆I∗ : ΩF → Ω
I∗
E induces, by
composition, a function
Hom(E,Ω∗) ∼= Hom(E
∗,ΩF )
∆I∗◦(−)−−−−−→ Hom(E∗,ΩI
∗
F )
with
∆I∗ ◦ (−) ⊣ ∀I∗ ◦ (−).
This adjunction in turn is the one that corresponds by Yoneda under the isomorphism
(4) to the adjunction π∗1 ⊣ ∀π1:
∀π1 : SubF (E
∗ × I∗)⇆ SubE(E
∗) : π∗1,
where π∗1 is pulling back along π1 : E
∗ × I∗ → E∗. I-indexed joins are treated
similarly.
The modal operator is given by the uniquely determined structure
τ : Ω∗ ⇆ ΩE : i, (10)
where τ is the classifying map of
⊤ = f∗(⊤) : 1→ Ω∗.
28
Lemma 4.2. The internal adjunction (10) is induced via the Yoneda lemma by an
external adjunction
∆A : SubE(A)⇆ SubF(f
∗A) : ΓA (11)
which is natural in A.7
Proof. Here, ∆A is f
∗ restricted to subobjects of A. It follows that ∆A is an injective
frame map, as f ∗ is a faithful left exact left adjoint. On the other hand, ΓA(X,m),
for any mono m : X ֌ f ∗A, is by definition the left-hand map in the following
pullback
• //


f∗X

f∗m

A ηA
// f∗f
∗A.
The resulting two functions, natural in A, have the form:
HomE(A,ΩE) ∼= SubE(A)⇆ SubF(f
∗A) ∼= HomF(f
∗A,ΩF ) ∼= HomF(A,Ω∗). (12)
By Yoneda they determine maps
δ : ΩE ⇆ Ω∗ : γ,
internally adjoint given that ∆A ⊣ ΓA, for each A in E . The map δ is monic, because
each ∆A is injective. It readily follows that δ = i and γ = τ . For δ is a monic frame
map and δ ⊣ γ, while the arrow
γ : Ω∗ −→ ΩE
obtained through the Yoneda lemma as above actually is the classifying map of the
top element f∗⊤ : 1→ Ω∗.
Lemma 4.3. The internal structure Ω∗ is a faithful frame, i.e. the canonical frame
map i : ΩE → Ω∗ is a monomorphism.
Proof. Since the maps ∆A in lemma 4.2 are injective, this means that ∆ : SubE(−)→
SubF(f
∗(−)) is a monic natural transformation. As i : ΩE → Ω∗ is obtained using
the Yoneda lemma from the maps ∆A, it readily follows that i is monic, because the
Yoneda embedding reflects monomorphisms.
Formulas ϕ (in one free variable, say) are thus interpreted equivalently in any of
the following ways (let M interpret the type of x):
JϕK ∈ SubF(f
∗M), M∗
JϕK
−−→ ΩF , M
JϕK
−−→ Ω∗,
where the third one follows from definition 2.3.
7Cf. e.g. [19].
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Moreover, let δM∗ be the classifying map of the diagonal 〈1M∗ , 1M∗〉 : M
∗ →
M∗ ×M∗. We will write its transpose along f ∗ ⊣ f∗ simply as
M ×M
δ∗−→ Ω∗ (13)
when M is clear. Then we have:
Lemma 4.4. The equality predicate for M∗ may be interpreted by the map (13),
obtained as the transpose along f ∗ ⊣ f∗ of
(M ×M)∗ ∼= M∗ ×M∗
δM∗−−→ ΩF .
The proof is immediate, given the soundness of the interpretation with respect to δM∗ .
Definition 4.5. By a geometric model we shall mean a model derived from a geo-
metric morphism in this way; specifically, where f : F → E and H = f∗(ΩF ).
To show, finally, that geometric models are a special case of algebraic ones, the
main thing that needs to be verified is that equality is interpreted the same way in
each case, i.e.:
δ∗ = i ◦ δM .
First, we make the following observation:
Lemma 4.6. For any map α : D → Ω∗, we have iτ ◦α = α iff the subobject classified
by the transpose α˜ : f ∗D → ΩF of α is of the form f
∗m : f ∗A ֌ f ∗D, for some
m : A֌ D in E . 
Proposition 4.7. For any object D in E , and any geometric morphism f : F → E :
δ∗ = i ◦ δD.
Proof. We prove this by showing
τ ◦ δ∗ = δD,
whence the statement follows from δ∗ = i ◦ τ ◦ δ∗ = i ◦ δD, where the identity
δ∗ = i ◦ τ ◦ δ∗ holds by applying lemma 4.6 to δ∗.
The proof is essentially contained in the following diagram
D
ηD //
∆D

(D∗)∗ //
(∆∗)∗

1
⊤

◆◆
◆◆
◆◆
◆◆
◆◆
◆◆
◆◆
◆
◆◆
◆◆
◆◆
◆◆
◆◆
◆◆
◆◆
◆
1
⊤

D ×D
ηD×ηD //
δ∗
55
δD
11
(D∗)∗ × (D
∗)∗
(δD∗)∗ // Ω∗
τ
&&▼
▼▼
▼▼
▼▼
▼▼
▼▼
▼▼
ΩE
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where ∆D = 〈1D, 1D〉, η is the unit of f
∗ ⊣ f∗, and δ, τ denote the respective
classifying maps. The square in the middle is a pullback, since f∗ preserves them.
Moreover, by the definition of δD, the large outer square is a pullback. Note further
that δ∗ = (δD∗)∗ ◦ηD×D, by the definition of δ∗ as the transpose of δD∗ along f
∗ ⊣ f∗.
Thus the desired equality would follow if the unit square were a pullback, for then
τ ◦ (δD∗)∗ ◦ ηD×D = τ ◦ δ∗
would classify ∆D, and so τ ◦ δ∗ = δD. This is in fact the case. For f : F → E being
surjective (i.e. f ∗ faithful) implies that the unit components, and therefore ηD × ηD,
are monic. A direct verification then shows that the square is a pullback.
Example 4.1. Kripke Models. As is well known, any functor F : C → D induces a
geometric morphism
f ∗ ⊣ f∗ : Sets
C → SetsD,
where f ∗ is precomposition with F , and f∗ is a right Kan extension. Let C = |D|
and F the inclusion i : |D| → D. Then the induced geometric morphism i∗ ⊣ i∗ :
Sets|D| → SetsD is surjective. The subobject classifier ΩD in Sets
D consists, for
each D, of the set of cosieves on D, which can be construed as the functor category
2D/D,
where 2 is viewed as the poset {0 ≤ 1}; while Ω|D|(D) = 2, for each D in D.
On the other hand, by the definition of right Kan extension, i∗Ω|D|(D) =
∏
h∈D/D 2 =
2|D/D|, as can also be seen from
i∗Ω|D|(D) ∼= HomD̂(yD, i∗Ω|D|)
∼= Hom|̂D|(i
∗(yD),Ω|D|).
The last set is (isomorphic to) the set of subfamilies of the functor i∗(yD) : |D| →
Sets, by the definition of the subobject classifier Ω|D|: each natural transformation
i∗yD = yD ◦ i = HomD(D,−) −→ 2
determines, for each D′ in D, a set of arrows D → D′. On arrows h : D → D′′, the
functor i∗Ω|D| is the function i∗Ω|D|(h) : i∗Ω|D|(D)→ i∗Ω|D|(D
′′) defined as
i∗Ω|D|(h)(A) = {f : D
′′ → X | f ◦ h ∈ A}.
The components of the (internal) adjunction i : ΩD ⇆ i∗Ω|D| : τ then read
iD : 2
D/D
⇆ 2|D/D| : τD,
where iD ⊣ τD “externally”. It is not hard to see that i is the inclusion, while
τD(A) =
∨
{S ∈ 2D/D | iD(S) ≤ A},
31
by the definition of right adjoint to the frame map i (cf. (6)). In words, τ maps
any family of arrows with domain D to the largest cosieve on D contained in it. In
particular, when D is a preorder, then D/D =↑ (D), the upward closure of D; while
2D/D is the set of all monotone maps ↑ (D)→ 2, i.e. upsets of ↑ (D), while 2|D/D| is
the set of arbitrary subsets of ↑ (D).
An arrow ϕ : E → i∗Ω|D| = 2
|−/D| in SetsD defines an indexed subfamily P of
the functor F , and conversely. Explicitly, given such ϕ : E → i∗Ω|D|, define subsets
Pϕ(D) ⊆ E(D), for each D in D and a ∈ E(D), by
a ∈ Pϕ(D) iff 1D ∈ ϕD(a). (14)
Conversely, given maps E(D) → 2, i.e. components of an arrow i∗E → Ω|D| in
Sets|D|, or equivalently a subfamily P of E, define a natural transformation ϕP :
E → i∗Ω|D| by
(ϕP )D(a) = {f : D → C | E(f)(a) ∈ P (C)}, (15)
These constructions are mutually inverse and so describe the canonical isomorphism
Hom(E, i∗Ω|D|) ∼= Hom(i
∗E,Ω|D|) ∼= Sub(i
∗E).
Note also that the transpose ϕ = εϕ∗ of ϕ : E → Ω∗ along the adjunction f
∗ ⊣ f∗
actually is the classifying map in Sets|D| of the subobject Pϕ of f
∗E defined in (14):
εCϕ
∗
C(a) = 1 iff 1C ∈ ϕ
∗
C(a)
iff 1C ∈ ϕC(a)
iff a ∈ Pϕ(C),
for any a ∈ E(C).
On the other hand, considering ΩD = 2
D/D instead of 2|D/D|, the same defini-
tions (14) and (15) establish a correspondence between subfunctors of E and their
classifying maps in SetsD. In particular, the classifying map of a subfunctor of E
factors through i∗Ω|K| via τ .
Thus, when D is a preorder, algebraic models in the complete Heyting algebra
i∗Ω|K| are precisely Kripke models on D. The “domain” of the model is given by
the functor E, while each E(D) is the domain of individuals at each world D. Each
formula determines, as an arrow ϕ : E → i∗Ω|K|, a subfamily of E, that is a family
(Pϕ(D) ⊆ E(D)). Then τ determines the largest compatible subfamily of that family,
i.e. a family closed under the action of E. Indeed, for x ∈ E(D),
x ∈ Pτϕ(D) iff 1D ∈ (τϕ)D(x).
Now (τϕ)D(x) is the maximal sieve on D just in case ϕD(x) is. So, if satisfied,
the right-hand side means that x ∈ Pϕ(D) and moreover F (f)(x) ∈ Pϕ(C), for all
C ≥ D. Semantically speaking, x satisfies τϕ (at D) just in case x (or rather its
“counterpart” FCD(x)) satisfies ϕ in all worlds accessible from D.
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Thus we recovered the natural adjunction
∆E : Sub(E)⇆ Sub(i
∗E) : ΓE
that succinctly describes the algebraic structure of Kripke models.
Lastly, presheaf semantics reduces to standard Kripke semantics for propositional
modal logic in the following sense. In the latter, propositional formulas are recur-
sively assigned elements in P(K), for a preorder K. Let P(↓ (−)) = Ω∗ be the
composite functor
K
↓
−→ Sets
P(−)
−−−→ Setsop.
Observe that
P(K) ∼= HomSetsKop (1,P(↓ (−))),
via assignments (where ϕ ⊆ P(K))
ϕ 7→ (ϕk = ↓ (k ∩ ϕ) | k ∈ K)
and
(ϕk | k ∈ K) 7→
⋃
k
ϕk.
Thus modelling formulas (in one variable, say) by maps of presheaves
M −→ P(↓ (−)) = Ω∗
yields precisely the familiar Kripke model idea for propositions, i.e. closed formulas.
Moreover, for constant domains:
Hom
Sets
Kop (∆M,P(↓ (−))) ∼= HomSets(M, lim←−P(↓ (−)))
∼= HomSets(M,P(K)).
Here, ∆ : Sets −→ SetsK
op
is the functor ∆(M)(k) = M , for any set M and k ∈ K.
A function ϕ : M −→ P(K) assigns to each individual in the domain M a set of
worlds for which the individual satisfies the formula represented by ϕ.
Kripke-Joyal forcing: Another way of seeing the close relation between presheaf
semantics and Kripke semantics is via the notion of “Kripke-Joyal forcing” [14, 12].
For any topos E one can define a forcing relation  to interpret intuitionistic higher-
order logic . Given an arrow ϕ : M → ΩE , let Sϕ be the subobject of M classified
by ϕ. Then for any a : X →M , define
X  ϕ(a) iff a factors through Sϕ. (16)
This holds iff ϕa = tX , where tX is the arrow ⊤ ◦ !X : X → 1 → ΩE . The idea
is that ϕ corresponds to a formula, while a is a generalized element of M , thought
of as a term x : X | a : M . In fact, ϕ and a are terms in the internal language
of E , reinterpreted into E by the forcing relation. The relation  satisfies certain
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recursive clauses for all the logical connectives [14, 12]. Conversely, starting with an
interpretation of the basic symbols of a higher-order type theory in a topos E (as
maps into ΩE), then these recursive clauses determine when a formula is true (“at
an object X”). When a is a closed term, i.e. a constant, for which one may assume
X = 1, then this says that the two arrows
1
a //
⊤
99
M
ϕ
// ΩE
are equal; i.e. the closed sentence ϕ[a/x] is “true”. In general, the forcing relation
thus defines when formulas are true (at X), much as in Kripke semantics, as we now
illustrate.
Consider presheaf toposes of the form SetsC
op
. In this case, the forcing relation
X  ϕ(a) can be restricted to objects X in E forming a generating set.8 For presheaf
toposes SetsC
op
the representable functors yC form a generating set, so one may as-
sume that X = yC, for some object C in C. Also, by the Yoneda lemma, generalized
elements a : yC → M may be replaced by actual elements a ∈ M(C). To say that
a : yC → M factors through a subobject S ∈ SubE(M) is then equivalent to saying
that the corresponding element a ∈ M(C) actually lies in S(C). As a result, the
forcing condition becomes
yC  ϕ(a) iff a ∈ Sϕ(C),
where, as before, ϕ classifies the subobject Sϕ ofM . We shall hereafter write C  . . .
instead of yC  . . . .
Now consider the standard Ω∗-valued model for classical higher-order modal logic
in a presheaf topos SetsC
op
, associated with the canonical geometric morphism
Sets|C| → SetsC
op
. We define another forcing relation C ∗ ϕ(a) which takes
this modal logic into account.
Definition 4.8. For any presheaf topos SetsC
op
, define a forcing relation ∗ for
arrows ϕ :M → Ω∗, objects C in C, and elements a ∈M(C) by:
C ∗ ϕ(a) iff C  ϕ(a), (17)
where  on the right-hand side is the usual forcing relation w.r.t. Sets|C| (as defined
in (16)), and (−) indicates transposition along f ∗ ⊣ f∗.
Further analysing the right-hand side of (17) gives:
C  ϕ(a) iff a ∈ Sϕ(C) (18)
where Sϕ is the subobject of M
∗ classified by ϕ in Sets|C|.
8Cf. [12]. One says that a set S of objects from E is generating, iff for any f 6= g : A⇒ B in E ,
there is an arrow x : X → A, for some X ∈ S, such that fx 6= gx.
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Proposition 4.9. Let ∗ be the forcing relation of Definition 4.8. Then for all
ϕ, ψ : M → Ω∗ and a ∈M(C) the following hold:
C ∗ ⊤ always
C ∗ ⊥ never
C ∗ ϕ(a) ∧ ψ(a) iff C ∗ ϕ(a) and C ∗ ψ(a)
C ∗ ϕ(a) ∨ ψ(a) iff C ∗ ϕ(a) or C ∗ ψ(a)
C ∗ ϕ(a)⇒ ψ(a) iff C ∗ ϕ(a) implies C ∗ ψ(a)
C ∗ ∀xϕ(x, a) iff C ∗ ϕ(b, a) for all b ∈M(C)
C ∗ ∃xϕ(x, a) iff C ∗ ϕ(b, a) for some b ∈M(C)
C ∗ ϕ(a) iff D ∗ ϕ(p
∗a) for every p : D → C
C ∗ t(a) ∈ u(a) iff (1C , tC(a)) ∈ (uC(a))C ,
for t : M → Nand u :M → ΩN∗
where  = iτ , and ∀xϕ is the arrow M
ϕ̂
−→ ΩM∗
∀M−−→ Ω∗, with ϕ̂ the exponential
transpose of M ×M
ϕ
−→ Ω∗, and similarly for ∃xϕ(x, a).
Remark 4.10. Although ∗ is a relation between objects C and arrows ϕ :M → Ω∗,
it also makes sense to think of the ϕ as formulas, with the clauses above holding w.r.t.
the arrow JϕK assigned to the formula ϕ as in section 2. For instance, interpreting a
syntactic expression ∃xϕ(x, y) (by 2.3) yields an arrow ∃M ĴϕK. When C is a preorder
this is then not merely similar to, but actually is the Kripkean satisfaction relation
between worlds and formulas, extended to higher-order logic.
Proof. We shall just do a few exemplary cases for the purpose of illustration. Con-
sider C ∗ ϕ(a) ∨ ψ(a), which by definition 4.8 means that a ∈ Sϕ∨ψ(C). Here,
Ω∗ × Ω∗
∨
−→ Ω∗ is the join map. Recall from proposition 4.1 that ∨ actually is of the
form ∨∗, for the join map Ω× Ω
∨
−→ Ω in Sets|C|. Thus the following commutes, by
naturality of the counit ε:
M∗ ×M∗
〈ϕ∗,ψ∗〉
//
〈ϕ,ψ〉 ((PP
PP
PP
PP
PP
PP
P
(Ω∗)
∗ × (Ω∗)
∗ (∨∗)
∗
//
ε×ε

(Ω∗)
∗
ε

Ω× Ω
∨
// Ω
That is to say,
ϕ ∨ ψ = ϕ ∨ ψ,
and so Sϕ∨ψ = Sϕ∨ψ. Since Sets
|C| is a Boolean topos, by the definition of Sϕ∨ψ in
Sets|C| we have:
a ∈ Sϕ∨ψ(C) iff a ∈ Sϕ(C) or a ∈ Sψ(C),
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i.e. if and only if C ∗ ϕ(a) or C ∗ ψ(a). The argument for the other logical
connectives is similar.
For ∀, by definition,
C ∗ ∀xϕ(x, a) iff a ∈ S∀M ϕ̂(C),
with
S∀M ϕ̂(C) = {a ∈M(C) | 1C ∈ (∀M ϕ̂)C(a)}
defined as in (14). By the definition of ∀M , and because |C| is discrete:
1C ∈ (∀M ϕ̂)C(a) iff 1C ∈
⋃
{s ∈ Ω∗(C) | Ω∗(f)(s) ≤ ϕ̂C(a)D(f, b),
for all f : D → C, b ∈M(D)}
iff 1C ∈
⋃
{s ∈ Ω∗(C) | s ≤ ϕ̂C(a)C(1C , b), for all b ∈M(C)}
iff 1C ∈ ϕC(a, b), for all b ∈M(C)
iff (a, b) ∈ Sϕ, for all b ∈M(C)
iff C ∗ ϕ(a, b), for all b ∈M(C).
The last two equivalences hold by the definition of Sϕ and ∗. To see the third
equivalence, let α : yC → M be the map that corresponds under Yoneda to a ∈
M(C). Then, by the definition of ϕ̂ (cf. (7)):
ϕ̂C(a)C(1C , b) = ϕC(α× 1M)C(1C , b) = ϕC(αC(1C), b) = ϕC(a, b).
Then, if 1C is in the union, it is in one of the s ∈ Ω∗(C), and thus 1C ∈ ϕC(a, b), for
all b ∈ M(C). On the other hand, if 1C ∈ ϕC(a, b), for all b ∈ M(C), then 1C is in
the union for s = {1C}.
The clause for ∈ follows from its definition:
Sε〈s,t〉 = {a ∈M(C) | 1C ∈ ε〈s, t〉C(a)}
= {a ∈M(C) | 1C ∈ εC(sC(a), tC(a))}
= {a ∈M(C) | 1C ∈ (sC(a))C(1C , tC(a))},
using the definition of the evaluation map ε : ΩA ×A→ Ω.
For , as before, iτϕ determines a subfamily of M with components
Siτϕ(C) = {a ∈M(C) | 1C ∈ (iτϕ)C(a)}.
But (iτϕ)C(a) is a sieve, as it factors through Ω(C), and so
Siτϕ(C) = {a ∈M(C) | (iτϕ)C(a) = ⊤C},
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for ⊤C the maximal sieve on C. However, by the defining properties of τ and i,
(iτϕ)C(a) = ⊤C iff ϕC(a) = ⊤C .
Therefore,
Siτϕ(C) = {a ∈M(C) | ϕC(a) = ⊤C}
= {a ∈M(C) | (χSϕ)C(a) = ⊤C}
= {a ∈M(C) | {p : D → C | p∗a ∈ Sϕ(D)} = ⊤C}
= {a ∈M(C) | p∗a ∈ Sϕ(D), for all p : D → C}.
In forcing terms:
C ∗ iτϕ(a) iff a ∈ Siτϕ(C)
iff p∗a ∈ Sϕ(D), for all p : D → C
iff D ∗ ϕ(p
∗a), for all p : D → C.
Example 4.2. Sheaf Models. For a topological space X the (surjective) geometric
morphism
i∗ ⊣ i∗ : Sets/X −→ Sh(X)
coming from the continuous inclusion i : |X| →֒ X gives rise to modal sheaf semantics
for classical S4 modal logic as described in [1]. This is most readily seen by viewing
sheaves on X as local homeomorphisms over X . In this case, the adjunction (11)
reads:
∆π : SubLH/X(E)⇆ SubSets/X(i
∗E) : Γπ
where E → X is a local homeomorphism. A subobject of i∗E in Sets/X is simply
a commutative triangle of functions in Sets
A 

//
  
❅❅
❅❅
❅❅
❅❅
E
~~⑦⑦
⑦⑦
⑦⑦
⑦⑦
X
which is entirely determined by a subset A ⊆ E. One obtains the largest subsheaf
of E contained in A just by applying the interior operator of E to A ⊆ E:
intA 

//
""❊
❊❊
❊❊
❊❊
❊❊
E
~~⑦⑦
⑦⑦
⑦⑦
⑦⑦
X
The horizontal inclusion is then continuous w.r.t. the subspace topology on intA.
The composite is then a local homeomorphism, because the restriction of any local
homeomorphism to an open subset of the total space (E) is one.
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This is therefore just the familiar topological semantics for propositional modal
logic, given by the adjunction
i : SubSh(X)(E) ∼= O(E)⇆ P(E) ∼= SubSets/X(i
∗E) : int
In this case the algebraic formulation via maps into the subobject classifier is
perhaps less intuitive. The subobject classifier ω : Ω→ X in Sh(X) has the fibers:9
ω−1(x) = lim
−→
x∈U
↓U
where ↓U is the set of all open subsets of U ∈ O(X). On the other hand, viewing
sheaves as a special kind of presheaves, the formulation is now more familiar. The
subobject classifier takes the form ΩX(U) =↓U (for V ⊆ U this acts by V ∩−, i.e. the
inverse image along the inclusion). Thus ΩX(U) = O(U) for the subspace topology
on U . In turn, Ω∗(U) = P(U) with the evident restriction along inclusions. Thus
propositions are modelled by natural transformations M → P to the contravariant
powerset-functor, while the map τU : P(U) → O(U), for any U ⊆ X , picks the
largest open subset contained in a given subset of U , i.e. the interior.
With this description, sheaf semantics may be seen as the generalization of the
familiar topological semantics for propositional modal logic to quantified languages.
The previous case of presheaves on a preorder K is actually a special case of this one
by taking the Alexandroff topology on K.
5 Geometric models from algebraic ones
The foregoing shows that every geometric model gives rise to a logically equivalent
algebraic model in the sense of section 2. The following observation, obtained through
general topos-theoretic considerations, states the converse.
Fact 5.1. For any complete Heyting algebra H in a topos E , the canonical structure
τ : H ⇆ ΩE : i
(i ⊣ τ) arises from a topos H and geometric morphism g : H → E , via H = g∗ΩH.
Proof. (sketch) The topos H may be defined as the category ShE(H) of internal
sheaves on H . A description of ShE(H) can be given in terms of locales in E (see [9]
C1.3). A local homeomorphism over the locale H is an open locale map E → H with
open diagonal E → E×H E, where the codomain is the product of locale morphisms
over H (in E). This is an internalization of the notion of local homeomorphism over
the “space” H , in view of the fact that a continuous map π : Y → X of topological
spaces is a local homeomorphism just in case both π and its diagonal (over X)
9 See e.g. [14].
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are open maps. Alternately, using the internal language of E , the category ShE(H)
may be described as consisting of internal presheaves on the site H (with the sup-
topology) that satisfy the usual sheaf property in the internal language. See [9], C1.3
for details.
Next, recall that for any two framesX, Y in E , there is an equivalence of categories
FrE(Y,X) ≃ Top(ShE(X), ShE(Y )) (19)
between frame homomorphisms Y → X in E and geometric morphisms ShE(X) →
ShE(Y ) [9, 14]. Then g : ShE(H) → E arises under this equivalence from the frame
map i, noting that
E ≃ ShE(ΩE).
Externally, the idea of (19) is that the inverse image part g∗ of a geometric morphism
g : Sh(X)→ Sh(Y ) restricts to a frame homomorphism
g∗ : SubSh(Y )(1)→ SubSh(X)(1),
where 1 is the terminal object, respectively. Observing that for any sheaf topos
Sh(X), we have SubSh(X)(1) ∼= O(X) gives the required frame map. On the other
hand, it is also well-known that a frame map Y → X induces a geometric morphism of
the required form for the sup-topology onX and Y , respectively. These constructions
are inverse and relativize to an arbitrary topos E instead of the usual category of
Sets [9, 10]. Moreover, the geometric morphism g is surjective if i is monic.
Lastly,
H ∼= g∗ΩShE(H),
because ShE(H) coincides with the hyperconnected-localic factorization of g itself,
which is determined (up to equivalence of categories) [10] as the sheaf topos
ShE(g∗ΩShE(H)),
whence it follows that
H ∼= SubShE (H)(1)
∼= g∗ΩShE (H).
This last observation applies in particular in case H = f∗ΩF is already of the
required form. Then ShE(Ω∗) occurs in the hyperconnected-localic factorization of f :
F //
f

❃❃
❃❃
❃❃
❃❃
ShE(Ω∗)
g
{{✈✈
✈✈
✈✈
✈✈
✈
E
and
f∗ΩF ∼= g∗ΩShE(f∗ΩF ).
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Externally, we have:
SubF(f
∗A) ∼= HomF(f
∗A,ΩF )
∼= HomE(A, f∗ΩF ))
∼= HomE(A, g∗ΩShE (f∗ΩF ))
∼= HomShE (f∗ΩF )(g
∗A,ΩShE (f∗ΩF ))
∼= SubShE(f∗ΩF )(g
∗A)
for all A in E . This allows us to restrict attention to localic surjective geometric
morphisms. For instance, the geometric morphism
i∗ ⊣ i∗ : Sets
|D| → SetsD
considered in the previous section is localic.
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